This paper studies a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral congestion pricing scheme on a simple two-mode (highway and transit) network: this scheme aims at simultaneously improving system performance, making every individual user better off, and having zero total revenue. Different Pareto-improving situations are explored when a two-mode transportation system serves for travel groups with different value-of-time (VOT) distributions. Since the congestion pricing scheme suggested here charges transit users negative tolls and automobile users positive tolls, it can be considered as a proper way to implement congestion pricing and transit subsidy in one step, while offsetting the inequity for the poor. For a general VOT distribution of commuters, the condition of Pareto-improving is established, and the impact of the VOT distribution on solving the inequity issue is explored. For a uniform VOT distribution, we show that a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing scheme always exists for any target modal split pattern that reduces the total system travel time.
Introduction
With the increasing number of automobiles on the roads and lower-than marginal cost pricing of auto use, misallocation and inefficient use of multi-mode transportation resources are often observed. To promote the use of public transportation, ease road congestion and alleviate environmental pollution, subsidies to local transit have become increasingly pervasive and important particularly in the more advanced and congested cities and countries. Currently, congestion pricing is being considered as a measure for restraining auto users and providing revenue for transit subsidy. Most studies considered the determination of both congestion delay and toll mainly on road networks only. Studies for inter-modal competition and pricing have been conducted (Sherman 1971; Braeutigam 1979; Tabuchi 1993; Jara-Diaz and Tudela 1993; De Borger et al. 1996; Mayet and Hansen 2000 , among many others), largely relying upon the economic theory of utility-maximizing consumers.
Although road pricing is theoretically and technologically easy to implement, it has long been viewed as a political issue. Road pricing can generate revenue and reduce social disutility simultaneously. However, most literature found pricing to be regressive when toll revenue refunding is not considered. Due to the diminishing marginal value of money and increasing value of time (VOT) with individual or household's income, users will benefit or lose in different levels (Franklin 2007) . The inequity effect should be studied at the person-level, and individuals are classified into four categories (Small 1992) : the tolled, the tolled-off, the tolled-on and the un-tolled to represent those who decide to stay on the tolled system after pricing, those who are priced-out, who are lured from the other unknown system because of the benefits from time saving, and who avoid the tolled facility in any case and are not effected by the pricing. In this respect, several researchers have looked into various revenue distribution strategies. For examples, Small (1992) emphasized that the congestion pricing may be progressive if a lump sum refunding is implemented, i.e. an equal travel allowance for all commuters. Goodwin (1989) suggested a combination of revenue uses in order to offset several congestion pricing impacts. Poole (1992) added that it might be possible to introduce off-peak discounts and peak-hour surcharges on a toll road. DeCorla-Souza (1995) proposed a cashing out strategy to induce a shift of peak-period travelers to other modes, thus reducing the need for additional infrastructure. Recently, Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) proposed a credit-based congestion pricing strategy, where the term 'credit' refers to a monetary cash-out. The method can help tackle the problem of congestion in an equitable and efficient fashion.
From a theoretical perspective, Bernstein (1993) examined the possibility of user-neutral congestion pricing with both positive and negative tolls in a bottleneck congestion model; Adler and Cetin (2001) discussed a direct distribution approach to congestion pricing, in which monies collected from users on a more desirable route are directly transferred to users on a less desirable route using a two parallel route example with bottleneck congestion. For a single Origin-Destination (OD) pair connected by a number of parallel routes, Eliasson (2001) showed that a tolling and refunding system that reduced aggregate travel time and refunded the toll revenues equally to all users would benefit all users. To realize the "fair access" to major airports under congestion pricing, Daniel (2001) evaluated some price-and-rebate programs and proposed several that are self-financing and Pareto-improving, which actually means winners compensate losers. Without direct revenue redistribution among users, Yang and Zhang (2002) took explicit consideration of the social and spatial inequity in a bi-level network toll design model with multi-class user equilibrium constraints. More recently, Yang and Guo (2005) studied various Pareto-improving congestion pricing and revenue-refunding schemes in general networks with multi-class users. A comprehensive treatment of the various theoretical issues of road pricing is given by Yang and Huang (2005) . In most previous studies, pricing and refunding schemes are generally considered in two separate, sequential steps. In this case, users might change their choice if they will receive different refunds by choosing different modes or paths. So refunding may drive traffic demand and flow pattern to a new equilibrium that might be different from that for pricing, thereby making the traffic equilibrium unstable (Yang and Guo, 2005) . The UE will fluctuate until the lump sum refunding scheme is introduced that one's choice doesn't change the amount of refund she receives.
This study looks into an alternative method for the Pareto-improving pricing scheme in a simple two-mode traffic network: revenue-neutral pricing scheme imposes direct positive toll on highway and negative toll on transit which actually means subsidy, while maintaining an aggregate zero revenue. Two central issues are addressed. First, whether or not Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing scheme exists for certain target modal split flow pattern? Specifically, an anonymous link toll scheme, i.e. an identical toll across users on the same link, is sought to satisfy three conditions simultaneously: improving system performance, making every individual user better off, and having zero total revenue. Second, what are the impacts of different VOT distributions, including the uniform VOT distributions, on the realization of a Pareto improvement?
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the problem and the basic model. In Section 3, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing schemes for a general VOT distribution. We also study the impact of the VOT distribution on the realization of the Pareto-improving goal. In Section 4, specific results are derived for the special case of a uniform VOT distribution, and a simple numerical example is provided. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
Problem Settings

Deterministic Mode Choice and Traffic Equilibrium
Consider a simple single O-D pair model to present a corridor with a congested highway running in parallel with public transit, as shown in Figure 1 . Several basic assumptions/settings in this article are listed and their meaning and limitations are discussed below.
The two-mode network with a single O-D pair means that only social inequity is concerned but the spatial inequity among different O-D pairs is ignored. For a network with many origins and destinations, both of the social and spatial inequity issues exist, which have different causes and need different solutions to offset the disadvantage. Then it could be more challenging to devise a combined pricing scheme with toll and subsidization that gives Pareto improvement.
(b) A fixed total demand. The total demand is d . Let T f denote the user volume on transit and
demand elasticity is ignored but internal elasticity is considered by allowing inter-modal competition. If the assumption were relaxed, i.e. external demand is also elastic, the level of toll would affect the total demand as well as the modal split. Subsidizing transit would induce excessive travel, which would be a disadvantage of scheme proposed here. Those "tolled-on" users, starting to use the system because of time saving or lower transit fare, are not considered here.
(c) Congested highway and congestion-free & underutilized transit. Suppose that the travel time on the highway is an increasing, continuous and convex function,
volume, A f , of users (vehicles) traveling through the highway. The capacity of transit is supposed to be large enough so that the travel time by the transit mode is a constant denoted by T t . The difference between the free flow travel times of the two modes is negative,
It is realistically assumed that, before introducing a toll scheme   , A T   to highway and transit respectively, a socially non-optimal modal split pattern emerges in the sense that the transit service with a lower marginal cost is underutilized, and the highway is overused with excessive congestion. It should be noted that the transit link could also be another highway that is longer but congestion-free. So our results can be applied to any single O-D pair network with one congested route and a parallel congestion-free route.
(d) Constant returns to scale on transit. We assume the average transit system operation cost per rider is constant and transit users need to pay a constant basic fee, T F , to cover the transit operating cost. This, together with constant transit (in-vehicle and out-of-vehicle) travel time in (c), implies the assumption of a constant return to scale in transit service. One should recognize that, with economies of traffic density road pricing can lead to modal shift toward public transport and thus touch off the "virtuous circle" of quicker driving time and higher-quality public transport service. Even without spending any of the road pricing revenues on public transport improvements, the combination of increased traffic speed and increased ridership permits large increases in service and ridership, reductions in user costs, and savings in average agency costs sufficient to pay for the increased service even while reducing fares (Small, 2004) .
(e) Constant automobile operating cost. Automobile users need to pay a constant basic monetary cost, A F , including fuel, insurance and maintenance fees and so on, which are assumed to be independent of travel time. To mimic real situations, it is assumed that the difference between the basic monetary user costs of the automobile and transit modes is 
where A c and T c are the total monetary costs on highway and transit respectively. Users choose their travel mode that minimizes their generalized travel disutility in a deterministic manner:
In the absence of toll,
) be the user indifferent to the two modes. Obviously, users with VOTs larger than   A f   will choose highway and users with VOTs smaller than
will choose transit. Then the untolled user equilibrium (UE) flow is
. We consider an interior untolled UE solution 0
, is introduced to highway and transit, respectively, to drive users' mode choices to a target flow pattern,
. For the unique tolled UE flow pattern, it holds that:
Our analysis focuses on exogenous target flow patterns rather than any particular optimal (first-best or second-best) one. Setting an arbitrary modal split target has the advantage of generality, and it includes the "optimal" split as a special case. Also, it should be mentioned that any feasible target flow pattern can be realized by toll schemes satisfying (4).
Given the untolled and tolled equilibrium flow pattern, the generalized travel disutility of the 
Pareto-improving and Revenue-neutral Toll Scheme
Definition: A toll scheme is said to be Pareto-improving if it holds that
and is said to be revenue-neutral if it holds that
Condition (5) means that the travel disutility of each individual user is reduced, i.e. everyone is made better off. Condition (6) means that the revenue from highway toll charge and the subsidy to transit are break-even.
From UE condition (4), any target flow pattern f can be supported as network equilibrium by a set of toll schemes characterized by the following equation:
From (6) and (7), a unique revenue-neutral toll scheme RN τ for certain target flow pattern f is given by:
One major task of this paper is to examine the existence of a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral toll scheme. If users are identical, a Pareto improvement is always possible by imposing an efficient toll scheme that improves the aggregate system performance and implementing a suitable revenue redistribution scheme (Yang and Guo, 2005) . However, when travelers are heterogeneous in VOT, the situation is much more complicated because of the inequity effect of pricing to users with different VOT, which is to be discussed in next subsection.
Here we shall establish a condition for the existence of a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral toll scheme. The condition is found to be closely related to the system performance improvement measured by the total system travel time T
 
A reduction in T by a toll scheme is represented by
where T and T  are the tolled and untolled total system travel time, respectively. By definition, the total system travel time has no obvious connection with the Pareto-improving goal, because the definition of T takes into account neither the fixed monetary costs of the two modes ( A F and T F ) nor the users' VOT, both of which are important in determining the utility of individual users. Nevertheless, we shall show later that a reduction in T by a revenue-neutral toll scheme is pertinent to Pareto improvement. Furthermore, reduction in T is by itself an important objective of congestion pricing, because total system travel time is a conventional system performance measure of a transportation system.
From an economic viewpoint, the following aggregate system disutility, C , in monetary unit is also a meaningful system performance measure:
Note that toll is not included in C (from a central planner's viewpoint). We refer to C as the total system cost. When a revenue-neutral toll scheme is implemented, C is equal to the sum of individual users' disutility. Thus, by definition, a Pareto-improving revenue-neutral toll scheme reduces the total system cost.
Inequity Issue in Congestion Pricing
To highlight the social inequity issue in the absence of revenue-neutral pricing, we consider highway pricing alone without transit subsidy. Such a toll scheme can improve the aggregate system performance as a revenue-neutral pricing scheme does. However, some users are worse off.
Suppose a toll scheme,
, is introduced to drive users from an untolled flow pattern, f  , to a target flow pattern f . Let
be the disutility change of the f -th user due to pricing as given below:
The disutility change as a function of user's VOT is given in Figure 3 , where 
(the A f  -th to the d -th users) use transit and thus are "un-tolled", their disutility remain unchanged. Users with
, are "priced-out", they stop using auto to avoid the toll but are worse off, because they forgo the benefits associated with lower travel time on highway. As a result the change in their travel disutility linearly increases with VOT. Users with
 continue to stay in highway and thus are "tolled". The "tolled" users benefit from time saving but tolerate toll, the change in their disutility linearly decreases with VOT. Thus the "tolled" users with lower VOTs suffer travel disutility increase (time saving does not compensate toll charge) and the "tolled" users with higher VOTs enjoy travel disutility decrease (travel time savings more than compensate toll charge). It is likely that all the "tolled"
users will be worse off if their VOTs are all near   A f  . In summary, the social inequity arises as a result of highway pricing due to the different changes in disutility among the users with different VOTs.
From Figure 3 , the indifferent user after highway pricing alone suffers the most disutility increase among all the travelers. Small (1983) identified this result using a similar model. It should be mentioned that the indifferent user after pricing suffers the most disutility increase is true even when we adopt a pricing scheme with transit subsidy. Because, with different pricing transit users are subsidized, it is possible to be Pareto-improving and the indifferent user will gain the least disutility decrease instead of suffering the most disutility increase.
Lemma 1: When a pricing scheme
is introduced to the system, the indifferent user after pricing suffers the most disutility increase or gains the least disutility decrease.
Revenue-neutral Pricing with General VOT Distributions
Existence of Pareto-improving and Revenue-neutral Pricing Scheme
In this subsection we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing scheme. (3) and (4), respectively, before and after highway pricing, and the definition of revenue-neutral pricing (6),
Then the following relation is true:
From the untolled UE condition (3), we have
Substitute (16) into the second term of the right-hand side of (15), we have
The proof is completed. ■ Proposition 1 states that condition (13) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a revenue-neutral pricing scheme to be Pareto-improving. In particular, condition (13) is related to condition (10) of total system travel time reduction. If the second term of its right-hand side is positive, then condition (13) becomes a relaxation of condition (10). This means that even if the total system travel time is increased by an amount less than the second term, everyone can still be better off. It shows an interesting result that the system time is increased but the system cost is decreased. If the second term of its right-hand side is negative, then condition (13) is stronger than condition (10), which means that only when the total system travel time is decreased to a certain value, a revenue-neutral Pareto improvement can be achieved.
It should be noted that the target modal split pattern  
, highway flow A f . If the VOT function is synthesized out of data collected from survey, and the highway travel time function is also known, then it is easy to solve inequality (13) to obtain (or check the existence of) a feasible range in terms of target highway flow such that any target highway flow within that range corresponds to a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing scheme. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deal with this problem analytically without any assumption on the form of the VOT function. A numerical example based on uniform VOT distribution is provided in section 4.
It is worthy to further note that when 0 F   , which means that the basic monetary costs of the two modes are equal, condition (13) simply becomes condition (10), and thus everyone will be better off through revenue-neutral pricing as long as the total system travel time is reduced. This is shown in Figure 4 
, those who move from highway to transit do not suffer travel time increase, all of the transit users after pricing benefit   T  which is the lump sum subsidy. The highway users after pricing will benefit more than   T  because their benefits from time saving increase linearly with their VOTs. 
The Impact of VOT Distributions
We now examine the impacts of VOT distributions on the realization of the Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing on the two-mode network. As shown in Section 2.3, the indifferent
